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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines, from both theoretical and policy perspectives, a limited
but important aspect of the patent system: Its role and operation in supplying
global demand for widely recognized health needs. It concludes that although the
patent system is without peer in routing resources to the creation of the
technological needs of modern societies, some aspects of that system operate
better than others. In this connection, this Article directs attention to ways in
which the patent system may produce less than optimum results in the markets
served by the pharmaceutical industry, as well as to related issues about how
research on the world's widely recognized health needs should be funded.
The patent system, once largely ignored by nonspecialists, has recently
received increased attention from legal academics, economists, and policy makers.
These analysts have focused both upon the system's domestic effects and upon
its effects in the global economy. The creation in the 1980s of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals with oversight over patent litigation' brought renewed strength
to the domestic patent system. Partly as a result of this reform, academic
examinations of the system, which began in earnest in the 1960s, have increased
dramatically. The negotiation of the World Trade Agreement in 1994 brought all
of intellectual property into the world trading system through the ancillary TRIPS
agreement,2 subjecting it to new critiques from those sensitive to the impact of
this property system upon the publics of the world's less developed regions.
Although some economists have been skeptical about the impact of the patent
system in generating new technology,3 others have recognized its potency.
Perhaps Kenneth Arrow's 1961 inquiry into the differing innovation incentives
found in concentrated and competitive markets4 provided the initial spark for the
substantial attention that the patent system has received from economists. Later
in that decade, William Nordhaus moved theoretical research a giant step forward
with the publication of his seminal work on the economics of the patent system,
5
' Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)).
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LGAL
INS'rRUMINTi.---RIsUI;iS tOF THE URU(;UAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
I See C.T. TAYLOR & Z. A. SII.BIRALSTON, THit . ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSINM
(1973); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation. An Empinical Study, 32 MGMT i. Sci. 173, 176 (1986).
' Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources/or Invention, in THF RA'Ii AND
DIRFCION OF INVENTIWVF, Ac'nvrfY (R.R. Nelson ed., 1962).
s WII.IAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWIT- AND WELFARE; A THIOREI TICAI.
TREATME.NT O ?TECHNOLOGICAL. CHAN;E, ch. 5 (1969).
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a work that stimulated an immense amount of analytical attention to the patent
system and its operation. Edmund Kitch provoked the interest of legal scholars
when, in the 1970s, he explained how the patent system operates as a vehicle for
staking out a particular area of technology for exclusive development,6 a condition
often critical to the investment of needed resources. Louis Kaplow drew the
attention of the legal community to the costs and benefits of the patent system
in his important 1984 work comparing the welfare effects of antitrust and patent
market restraints. Robert Merges took the lead in examining the operation of the
patent system in a series of articles in the early 1990s.' Since Merges's pioneering
work, legal scholars have joined others in a flood of works examining the patent
system and its operation. Recently, Mark Lemiley and Dan Burk provided a major
contribution to this research with an examination of how the patent system
operates in different industries.9 Throughout this period, policy makers generated
new legislative modifications to the patent system. In the 1970s, congressional
concern about the impact of time-consuming FDA review of new drug
applications resulted in legislative extensions of the patent term for
pharmaceutical companies that had lost initial years of patent protection to that
review.' ° In the 1980s, policy makers focused upon the patent system as an agent
for economic rejuvenation, with the result that Congress created the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals." And in the 1990s, Congress approved the NAFTA
and WTO agreements that provided new strength to patents and other intellectual
property rights throughout North America and the world.
12
Currently, the operation of the patent system is on the forefront of
controversies, both domestic and international, about its effects upon pricing and
exclusion in the pharmaceutical industry. We allow patentees to exercise exclusive
rights-rights that may sometimes be equivalent to monopolies--over their
inventions for a term of years precisely to create incentives to invent. And yet
users of pharmaceuticals, especially the elderly, have complained so much about
high pharmaceutical prices that Congress has legislatively reformed the Medicare
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. Rjv. 1813 (1984).
See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainly and the Standard ofPatentabifly, 7 HIGH TiWH. L.J. 1 (1992);
Robert Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COUM. L. REV. 839
(1990); Robert P. Merges, CommercialSuccess and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76
CA1 .. L. REv. 803 (1988).
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Poli ievers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. RF.V. 1575 (2003).
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and
35 U.S.C.).
" See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 25.
12 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
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Act to subsidize the purchase of pharmaceuticals. 3 The public policies that foster
monopoly pricing in the patent law and those that subsidize purchasing in the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
(amended Medicare Act) appear to be in some tension. These Congressional
actions are in further tension with the actions of Canadian and European
regulatory schemes that are designed to place upward limits on pharmaceutical
prices. 4 They are in even greater tension with strongly held beliefs of third world
governments and their publics that the patent systems of the United States and
other Western nations are depriving the world's poor of essential medications.'
5
This Article addresses the broad interplay between the incentive structure of
the patent system and that system's social benefits and costs, viewed both on a
national scale and, to a significant extent, on an international one. The Article
examines the relation of private and social value to investment (and thus focuses
upon the basic economics of the system) with a view to identifying the system's
weaknesses. It draws heavily from Louis Kaplow, who developed a way of
conceptualizing the marginal social costs and benefits of the patent system. It
also draws from Kenneth Arrow, who described incentives for innovation in
competitive and monopoly contexts.
This Article compares the operation of the incentive structure of the patent
system with other mechanisms for fostering inventive activity as important
background for the Article's ultimate focus upon the relationship between the
patent system and the generation of life-saving drugs. Although the Article
readily concedes the general superiority of the patent system for eliciting inventive
activity, the Article suggests that its superiority may not extend throughout the
entire range of potential inventive activity. Indeed, the Article raises the question
as to whether the patent system is superior in the context of pharmaceutical
" Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173,117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395w (2003)). Section
101 of the legislation adds, inter alia, subsidization of prescription-drug benefits to the Medicare
program. § 101. The popular press is paying increasing attention to high drug prices in the United
States vis-i-vis Canada and other developed nations. See, e.g., Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele,
Why We Pay so Muchfor Drugs, T1Mr-, Feb. 2, 2004, at 4; Josh Benson, Drugged, NEw R1i'UBI.Ic, Nov.
7, 2003, at 12; Roger Parloff, The New Drug War, FORTUNE, Mar. 8, 2004, at 144.
" Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. P-4, S. 91 (1985) (Can.); Case 267/95, Merck & Co. v.
Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285; Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063;
Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147.
15 See, e.g., Naomi A. Bass, Note, Impliations of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries:
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brag /l and South Africa in the 2 1st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'I.L. RF, V.
191 (2002) (referring to the "inherent conflict between the implementation of internationally-
acceptable pharmaceutical patent laws and the need to maintain affordable medicine within the
poorest communities").
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products that play, or could play, critical roles in the control of certain life-
threatening diseases or other disabilities.
The Article builds on the Kaplow perspective for assessing social costs and
benefits. In so doing it attempts to articulate a perspective for carrying on the
debate about the operation of the patent system and its application to
pharmaceutical research. Drawing from that perspective, the Article raises at least
two important policy issues especially connected with marketing pharmaceutical
products and fostering pharmaceutical research. First, it raises the issue of price
discrimination. Are laws, customs, or other practices discouraging or otherwise
impeding the very price discrimination that could reduce deadweight loss and
thereby increase social welfare? Second, when should public policy foster
inventive activity through means other than the patent system?
Part II of the Article reviews the standard incentive theory underlying the
patent system. It summarizes the theory under which the patent law is said to
harness the incentives of the inventor for the benefit of society. Part III examines
the incentive structure, with particular emphasis upon two factors that affect the
profitability of that research: (1) the probabilities that the firm undertaking the
research will succeed in obtaining a patent for a commercially valuable result, and
(2) the effects of the time lag between the period in which funds are committed
to research and the period in which the results of that research produce revenue.
Part IV employs the marginal analysis developed by Louis Kaplow to sketch out
a schema for balancing social benefits against social costs, a schema that initially
employs a linear analysis. Part IV also introduces the time dimension discussed
in Part III into the analysis of social costs and benefits, concluding that as the
patent term increases, the rate of increase of social benefits slows while the rate
of increase of social costs increases. Finally, Part IV expands its schema by
dropping the linear constraint from its model. With that modification, the model
reveals that the proportionality between social benefit and cost that would
accompany a linear model can be transformed, at least in theory, into a vastly
disproportionate relationship. Part V then raises the question of whether price
discrimination can remedy these welfare problems. Part VI attacks the welfare
problem from another angle. It inquires whether there may be a class of new
pharmaceutical products for which financing schemes other than the patent
system would better maximize aggregate welfare.
[Vol. 12:75
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II. PATENT THEORY, MARKET FAILURE, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND
SOCIAL WELFARE: THE BEGINNINGS OF ANALYSIS
A. IN GENERAL
The theory of patent law is straightforward. Society benefits from new
technology. Yet in the absence of patent protection, invention would often go
unrewarded. 6 Unless a portion of this newly created economic value can be
captured by its inventor, there is no incentive to innovate. 7 Indeed, in certain
cases there would be a negative incentive: Invention often requires the
expenditure of substantial resources in research and experimentation. This failure
of the market to supply the incentive to invent is a result of a crucial absence of
property rights.
When people provide goods and services, the property rights regime enables
them to capture the economic value which they create by providing these goods
and services."i A producer or merchant owns the goods which are produced or
provided. This enables him to trade the goods for compensation. In a similar
way a service provider ensures that it provides services only on condition of being
paid. The common law property regime requires augmentation in those
circumstances in which property rights do not provide a means for an inventor
to capture at least a portion of the economic value which she has created. This
void in the common law is filled by the patent law. 9
To an inventor who can meet its stringent standards, the patent law confers
an exclusive right to make, use or sell the invention for a twenty-year period,
commencing with the date on which the inventor files his patent application. °
Since the patent office normally takes one to three years in evaluating the patent
and in negotiating with the patentee over the scope of his claims, the effective
legal term may closer to seventeen years.2' For products like pharmaceuticals that
require regulatory approval before marketing can begin, the effective period of
protection may be further reduced. 2 The inventor's reward, as it is sometimes
"JOHN Gj.ADST ONF MIL.LS III FT ,AL., PAT.NT LAW FUNDAMENTAIS § 1:30 (2d ed. 2004).
17 Id.
" See Daniel J. Gifford, Innovation and Creativiy in the Fine Arts: The Relevance and Irrekvance of
Copyright, 18 CARDOzo Aw'is & ENT. L.J. 569, 572-73 (2000).
19 Id
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002) (specifying patent term and exclusive rights of the patentee).
Professor Lemley concluded in 1964 that the average time consumed in patent prosecution
was 864 days or 2.36 years. Mark A. Lemley, An empincalStdy of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 385 (1994).
22 This problem of regulatory delay was recognized by Congress in the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which permits extensions of the patent term equal to the time in which the patentee
J. INTELL PROP. L
called, allows her to exploit these exclusive rights. 23  Her reward is thus
determined directly by the receptivity of the market to her product. If the
product is in high demand, then she is likely to profit handsomely. Yet however
ingenious the invention, there is little or no reward to the inventor unless buyers
appreciate it and are willing to pay for it.
The patentee's dependence upon the combination of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent law with the incentives of the market has both positive
and negative effects. On the positive side, the system ensures that incentives are
directed towards generating products that people want. On the negative side, the
patent system does not provide incentives to produce products for which there
is a social need but no economic demand, such as drugs for diseases (like sleeping
sickness) that primarily affect populations with little purchasing power.24 The
patent system, almost by definition, also does not work to stimulate primary
research.25 In these latter areas (the needs of the poor, and primary research)
alternative systems of stimulating research and invention, such as by government
funding26 or by post hoc government rewards, are, or may be, necessary.2 The
patent system also generates inefficiencies: The patentee's exclusive rights permit
it to charge super-competitive prices for the patented product, with the result that
some potential customers who value the invention at more than its cost of
production but at less than the price charged by the patentee go unserved.25 In
the language of economists, this is a deadweight loss, or a loss to society resulting
from a misallocation of resources.29
awaited final FDA approval plus one half of the post-patent issuance time taken for running clinical
tests. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1), (2) (2002). The period calculated in this manner, however, together with
the remaining patent term cannot exceed fourteen years. Id § 156(c)(3), nor can an extension can
exceed five years. Id § 156(g)(6)(A).
I Gi.ADSTONE ET AI.., supra note 16, § 1:30.
24 R. CAR]. MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTus § 6:4 (4th ed. 2004).
25 Primary research is not directed towards the useful. By contrast, the Patent Act limits
protection to the "useful." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
26 Most basic research is funded by the federal government. See 2001 STATISTICAL ABSIRAC'
OF THE UNITED SrA'tHs 508, Table no. 769, availabk at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/
Olstatab/stat-abOl.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
27 Scholars have advanced numerous suggestions for a reward system of stimulating research.
The focus of many of these proposals has been the elimination of the deadweight loss problem.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Peifecing Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. RPdV. 115, 122-27, 169 (2003);
Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus IntelkctualPmpery Rights, 44 J. L. & ECON.
525, 529 (2001).
25 These potential customers are represented in the portion of the demand curve that lies below
the super-competitive price set by the patentee and above the point at which the marginal-cost curve
intersects the demand curve. In Figure 1, infra, Part IV.A, this would be the portion of the curve
DD'between points A and B.
ROBERI'S. PINDYCK & DANI EL L. RUBINFEI.,D, MICROFCONOMICS 292 (5th ed. 2001); see also
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Because the patent system operates through harnessing market-based
incentives, the structure of those incentives bears examination. The expected
value of the patented invention provides the incentive to undertake the research
and development that ultimately produce it. Before a potential inventor commits
an investment to research and development activities, it assesses the expected
profit from that investment. And, of course, it compares that expected profit
with expected returns from alternative investments.
B. THE PATENT SYSTEM AS AN ADJUNCT TO THE MARKET
Although the patent system is not the only means available for fostering
invention, it possesses certain characteristics that enable it to mesh with the
market more or less seamlessly.3° We observed earlier that the patent system
solves a market failure: In the traditional property regime the absence of rights
over inventions means that the economic incentives that elsewhere foster
productive behavior would not, in the absence of the patent system, foster
inventive behavior.3 1 By providing these missing rights, the patent system
broadens the reach of the market, endowing it with a major responsibility for
stimulating invention in both end products and technology.
It is in this augmentation of market mechanisms where the advantages and
disadvantages of the patent system lie. By providing missing property rights and
relying upon the market to provide both the inventive stimulus and ultimate
reward, the patent system maximizes the extent to which inventors direct their
focus to the needs and wants that society most values (as measured by market
demand), and minimizes the extent to which inventors will direct their focus to
unwanted goods and services.32 Throughout the operation of the patent system,
the market plays the key role. Potential inventors look to the market for clues as
to what kinds of products are likely to be rewarded. They gear their efforts
according to the clues that the market provides. And the extent to which they are,
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 108 (1978)
(discussing the deadweight loss as representing the misallocation of society's resources).
0 By protecting inventions, the patent system creates a property right whose value is market
dependent. The patent system thus provides the legal framework that enables market incentives to
stimulate creative activity by potential inventors and allows the give and take of the market to
determine the rewards to actual inventors. Other possible means of fostering inventive activity
include government subsidies for useful research and government rewards or prizes for inventive
activities. Government subsidies for useful research might take a form analogous to the actual
government subsidies for basic research. See 2001 STATISTICAl. ABSTRACT, supra note 26. On
stimulating research through rewards or prices, see Abramowicz, supra note 27; Shavell & Van
Ypersele, supra note 27.
"' See Gifford, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
32 MOY, supra note 24, § 6:4.
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in fact, rewarded for their inventive activity is determined by the market. The
objective forces of the market thus perform critical roles in directing the course
of inventive activity.33 Because no other decision-making mechanism can match
the market's predictive abilities or its ability to continually reassess and reevaluate,
the patent system, which incorporates these market mechanisms, partakes of these
advantages. The superiority of the patent system over alternative means of
fostering inventive activity thus lies in its ability to harness the powerful forces of
the market to its ends. Yet it is also this attachment of the patent system to
market mechanisms that account for its disadvantages.
C. CLASSES OF INVENTIONS AND THE LOCI OF THE PATENT SYSTEM'S
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
In a well-known paper in 1962, Kenneth Arrow divided inventions into two
classes.34 In the first class are innovations which reduce production costs
substantially, and in the second class are innovations which reduce costs in lesser
amounts.3' The first class embraces innovations which lower cost so much that,
if a monopolist was in control of the market, that monopolist would set the post-
innovation profit-maximizing price below the level of the old unit production
cost.3 6 The second class consists of other cost-reducing innovations.3" This
classification of inventions worked well for Arrow's paper, which sought to
distinguish the profit generated by invention in a monopoly marketplace from
that generated by invention in a competitive marketplace, 3 s and his classification
has has been followed by others. Nordhaus, for example, employed that
classification, and called the first class "drastic" inventions. 39  Arrow's
classification also works for this Article. Drawing from (and somewhat
modifying) traditional legal terminology, this Article calls these two classes of
inventions "pioneer" inventions" and "improvement" inventions.
33 Id
34 Arrow, supra note 4, at 620-24.
"' Id
' Id
37 Id
3' NORDHAUS, supra note 5, at 72-73.
4,, Cf Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898), which heald,
This word [pioneer invention] . . . is commonly understood to denote a patent
covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of
such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art,
as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of what had gone
before.
In using the term "pioneer invention" to refer to a major invention in the Arrow sense, see supra
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The patent system probably operates in its least controversial mode in
fostering improvement inventions. Here the ratio of deadweight loss to profit is
minimized.4 Minimizing this ratio mutes controversy over the optimum length
of the patent term in the context of improvement inventions. And fostering
improvement inventions shows the operation of the patent system at its best.
The benefits of the system's decentralized incentive structure ensure that adequate
attention is directed to improvements of technologies at levels that fall below the
threshold of public visibility, but which, in the aggregate, contribute significantly
to the improvement of society's productive efficiencies.42 Probably most patent
activity concerns with improvement inventions.43 If so, then most patent activity
is concentrated where it raises few controversial issues about social costs and
benefits.
The patent system's most apparent disadvantages involve the deadweight
losses that the system generates by conferring market power on patentees.'
These losses may be a part of a system that generates inventive activity, but they
are, nonetheless, a social cost. Pioneer inventions are likely to generate higher
ratios of deadweight loss to profit than improvement inventions.45 In some cases,
the ratio of deadweight loss to profit might be very high. As a result, pioneer
inventions better raise issues about the system's social costs and benefits. Of
course, the deadweight loss generated by pioneer inventions is also a measure of
46the social value created by these inventions. Society wants and needs pioneer
inventions. The questions are whether patent terms are too long and whether
these inventions can be generated with a lesser degree of deadweight loss?
note 4, at 620-24, is employing that term in a related, but slightly different, sense from that used by
the courts.
" See infra Part IV.A.
42 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, IntellectualProperty Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'I. L. 471, 478-79 (2000) ("In the vast majority of cases, invention involves minor adaptations
of existing technologies and products. The cumulative impacts of these small inventions can be
critical for growth in knowledge and productive activity.").
43 Id
' Generating deadweight loss is a widely recognized social disadvantage of the patent system.
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1269
(2004) (referring to the deadweight loss as a significant social cost). Because the patent law confers
exclusive right to make, use, and sell the invention upon the patentee, the patentee is likely to
exercise whatever economic power these exclusive legal rights generate. Arrow's analysis describes
the relative economic powers of pioneer inventors and of improvement inventors. See infra Part
IV.A.
45 See infra Part IV.A.
' The more value that society places on an invention and the consequent more power possessed
by the patentee to set price above marginal cost, the greater will be the deadweight loss. From this
perspective, deadweight loss is a rough measure of the invention's social value.
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The public is probably most conscious of patentee market power over new
pharmaceutical products. Because pharmaceuticals are one of the few places
where a single patent covers an entire product,47 they may be less subject to
pricing constraints than other inventions that are improvements to machines or
processes and for which pre-existing technologies are ready substitutes. The
media has reported extensive public concern over what are perceived as unduly
high price levels for patented pharmaceuticals, a concern to which Congress has
recently responded.4" Beyond these domestic welfare and distributional issues,
however, the pricing of patented pharmaceutical products appears to create
extensive deadweight losses in third world nations.49 These real and perceived
disadvantages of the patent system, as it operates in the pharmaceutical industry,
may be accompanied by some weakening of the informational advantages that the
system draws from its close interaction with the market."0 The system's ability to
harness market-supplied information, one of its major advantages, may constitute
less of an advantage with certain kinds of pharmaceutical products where, in the
area of critical and life-saving drugs, needs are widely recognized. Indeed, the
patent system's close interaction with the market explains why pharmaceutical
companies do not develop drugs for the cure of diseases afflicting poor nations:
Such products would not be profitable. None of these remarks are intended to
say that the patent system does not work in this industry or that it works
particularly badly. Neither are they intended to say that social costs outweigh
benefits in generating new pharmaceuticals. Rather, these remarks merely point
out that in this area the patent system's advantages appear weaker than they do
in other areas. These apparent weaknesses in the way the system operates in
'7 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1590, which states:
In some industries, such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a single patent
normally covers a single product. Much conventional wisdom in the patent
system is built on the unstated assumption of such a one-to-one
correspondence.... Such a correspondence is the exception rather than the rule,
however. Machines of even moderate complexity are composed of many
different pieces, and each of these components can itself be the subject of one
or more patents.
See also Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetiive Settlement of Intellectual Propert Disputes, 87 MINN.
L. R.v. 1719, 1738 (2003).
" Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
4 See, e.g., Sean Flynn, Legal Srategiesfor Expanding Access to Medicnes, 17 EMoRY INI'", L. RE.V.
535, 540-41 (2003) (describing prices for anti-retroviral drugs in South Africa as exceeding the
median household income in that nation).
' The incentives generated by the patent system stimulate potential inventors to learn about and
to address technological and other problems afflicting highly specialized fields of endeavor. But the
incentives of the patent system are not needed to bring to light the need for cures for diseases
threatening the lives of large populations. See infra Part VI.
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pharmaceutical markets are discussed below. This Article then discusses means
for minimizing those weaknesses.
III. THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE INVENTOR:
WHERE SOCIAL BENEFIT MEETS PRIVATE INCENTIVE
5 1
A firm contemplating research to develop a new product necessarily
investigates whether the research is likely to succeed and whether the revenues
that the product generates will be likely to cover its costs and produce a profit.
5 2
The ordinary lag between the time when a firm introduces a new product and the
time when its competitors bring rival products to market provides a window for
the innovating firm to capture much of the economic value that it has created. 3
That period of de facto exclusivity is sufficient to support modest research and
development. The patent system provides legally protected exclusivity for the
longer periods required to justify the larger investments that may be necessary to
design highly innovative products.54
Thus, a firm contemplating a large research investment considers first the
chances that its research will succeed. Second, it considers the probabilities that
it (rather than one of its rivals that may also be conducting research) will be able
to obtain a patent on the product. Third, it assesses the amount of expected
revenue that the product is likely to generate and the costs that it will incur in
producing the product.
A. THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
A potential innovator must, of course, balance the amount of its research and
development costs and its probability of successfully developing the innovation
against the value of the innovation.5 In addition, it must also weigh the risk that
a rival will also succeed in developing the invention. Professor Robert Merges
breaks the decision about committing funds to research into two stages. 6 In the
first stage, the inventor decides whether to undertake preliminary experimentation
5' The discussion Part III and Part IV, infra, considers the value of the patented invention. The
Article distinguishes between the aggregate social value of the invention and the private value to the
inventor. In the next Part, the Article considers the social value of invention. Here, because of the
interest in the incentive effects of the patent system, there is concern with the private value to the
inventor.
52 Merges, Uncertainy and the Standard of Patentabii, supra note 8, at 10-12.
51 Id at 31.
54 See id. at 20-23.
5' Id at 21.
56 Id.
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on an invention.17 In the second stage, the inventor decides whether to develop
the invention.5 8 As Merges points out, this model captures some of the
complexity of the real world: The results of the preliminary experimentation in
the first stages provide information that will recast the probabilities of success
that the inventor weighs when deciding whether to proceed into the second
stage.59 Indeed, an inventor is continually facing new decisions with increasing
amounts of information as the project proceeds.6" Thus, Merges's analysis fits
nicely with a third stage of the development process identified by Edmund
Kitch.6 In Kitch's model, issuance of a patent is treated as tantamount to staking
out an area for commercial development.62 In this post-patent stage, the inventor
has solved the basic technology problem and has won the race to the patent
office. At this late stage, an inventor deciding whether to go forward must weigh
the costs of commercial development against his estimate of commercial
success.
63
Let us now consider the probability of success in the quest to develop the
innovation. If only one firm is in the research race, then that firm undertakes the
research if the value of the anticipated product multiplied by the probability of
successfully developing it is greater than the cost of the required investment in
research and development (R&D).' But if two firms decide to undertake
investment in similar R&D, the dimensions of the problem change. If one firm
develops the product and the second firm does not, the successful firm acquires
the entire value of the product.6 But it is possible that both firms may succeed
7 Id
58 Id.
59 Id. at 23-25, 27.
60 See id.
61 See general# Kitch, supra note 6.
62 See id at 265-66.
" The present discussion collapses the two stages identified by Merges, Uncertaint and the
Standard of Patentabilio, supra note 8, at 21, for ease in presentation. Moreover, it also combines
inventor's assessments about the probabilities of succeeding in his quest for a patented invention
with his assessments of succeeding in the race to the patent office. Combining these several issues
confronting an inventor here is not problematic so long as we remember that we are employing a
simplifying model of a process that in real life involves a series of decisions, each of which draws
upon a body of information that is continually being augmented.
64 See Oz SHY, INDUSTRIAIORGANIZATION: THEORY AND APPLICATION 224-25 (1995). Let:
V = the private value of the invention; I = the anticipated cost of research and development; c
[where a < 1] = the probability of technical success; 1 -C = the probability of failure. If only one
firm seeks to develop the product, then it will undertake the investment if its expected profit (7) is
ac V > L Id Note that Vis less than the social value of the invention, which includes consumer as
well as producer surplus. V here is the capitalized value of producer surplus.
6 The probability that one firm develops the product and the second firm does not is: a(I -a).
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technologically but only one of them wins the race to the patent office and
thereby captures the potential economic value of the product. Indeed, regardless
of how many firms succeed technologically, only one will receive the patent.6
The expected value of product development must account for both situations.
Since only one firm can win the patent race, the probability of succeeding overall,
that is, the probability of both developing the technology and receiving the patent,
is the multiple of the two probabilities (the probability of developing the
technology multiplied by the probability of receiving the patent).6 Accordingly,
the ex ante expected profit for each firm is discounted by both probabilities. Of
course, any number of firms may enter the research and innovation race. If we
assume that each of the successful innovators has an equal chance to obtain a
patent, then the expected value of the patent becomes the value of the innovation
divided by the number of successful innovators.6" As the number of firms
focusing their efforts on developing the same innovation increases, the chance of
success for any one firm decreases. Indeed, as the number of firms in the patent
race increases, the expected value of the invention to any one of them approaches
zero.
69
'c' Under the patent law, only the first inventor receives a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2002).
It is necessary to modify Shy's analysis somewhat when dealing with the probability that both firms
succeed technologically, but only one firm succeeds in obtaining the patent. In the two-firm case
discussed by Shy, the two share the product's value when both succeed. See SHY, supra note 64, at
224. This, of course, cannot be literally true. If the product is patentable, the first inventor captures
the entire value of the invention. Shy's treatment is acceptable for analytical purposes, however,
because treating the rival firms as sharing the value of the invention is tantamount to according each
of the rival firms an equal probability of winning the race to the patent office. The probability of
this result is a 2 . See id. The expected value of product development must take into account both
situations. Accordingly, the expected profit for each firm is: I" = CC(l - CC)V + CC'V/2. Id. at 225.
Each firm will undertake the requisite R&D if a(1 - a)V + CIV/2 > I, or equivalently if a(2 -
C&)V/2 > L Id. Again, analysis shows that in areas of high cost R&D, firms will be increasingly
reluctant to undertake R&D as the number of equally competent rivals in the research race grows.
With three firms the potential payoff is: 7r-= a (1- CL-V+ 2a:(l - aL)V/2 + aIV/3. Id. Each firm
will undertake the requisite R&D if: x(1 - af V + 2c&(1 - a)V/2 + 'V//3 > L Id. In its more
generalized form, the expected profit for each firm doing research for product development grows
in complexity:
It = lr) a' (1-a)'' V/I
0= (-1)! (n-l)!
The probabilities of both events occurring is the multiple of the two probabilities. See, e.g.,
S'IIWIN M. CRAI'ON, QUANrTATIVEI MIHODS t)it LAwYF~Rs 354-55 (1994).
" The expected value of the patent to any one potential inventor is its value multiplied by the
probability of obtaining it. If, for example, five firms each have an identical chance of obtaining it,
each firm has a one in five (or 209/6) chance of winning the patent race. See infra note 89.
"' See supra note 66.
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B. RETURNS DISCOUNTED TO PRESENT VALUE
The expected profit that is salient to the inventor is, of course, the discounted
present value of the expected future returns. As a result, the more distant the
future revenues, the lower is the inventor's contribution to the incentive structure
of the patent system.
1. Incentives and Discounted Future Revenues. Because the expected profit is
realized over a period that begins only after the invention is fit for commercial
exploitation, the comparison of expected profit to investment-as noted
above-necessarily is a comparison of present costs with future earnings.
Earnings are necessarily weighted less than the research costs that generate them
because earnings must be discounted to present value while the latter do not.
Moreover, the anticipated returns must be adjusted in several ways. Part III.A,
supra, noted that returns must be adjusted for the estimated probabilities of
technological success, as well as for the probabilities that technological success
may be rendered moot by others winning the race to the patent office.
This section focuses upon the value of the anticipated returns. At the stage
at which the investment commitment is made, the present value of the anticipated
returns is at its lowest.7" Since the research and development work has not yet
begun, the period in which the anticipated returns are generated is still some time
away. The inventor receives no returns until the invention is produced and in a
form for commercial use. Thus if the research and development period takes
three years, the first returns will not begin until then. In that case, the first year's
anticipated returns must be discounted for that three-year wait.7' And, of course,
the returns generated in each year of the patent term must be discounted
accordingly.72 Thus, if the patent application is filed three years after the
commencement of research and the product is immediately marketed, the returns
to the investor (viewed from the date of his investment) from each year of the
twenty-year patent term would have to be discounted from three to twenty-three
years.
Kitch's focus upon patent rights as means of staking out a technology for
commercial development73 calls attention to the fact that the early years of the
patent term may not be usable for commercial exploitation. However long this
post-patent period of development extends, it consumes some of the protected
70 The present value of anticipated returns is lowest at the time investment is committed to
research because the dates on which the returns will be realized are at their most distant and are
discounted to their maximum extent at that time.
71 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 29, at 534-35.
72 Id.
13 See Kitch, supra note 6.
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patent period, narrowing further the period of return on investment. 4 Modifying
the above example to take account of a period of development, there might be a
three-year period of research followed by the filing of a patent application, which
is then followed, say, by a two-year period of development. Since the twenty-year
patent term begins with the filing of the patent application, the two-year
development period in the example reduces the commercially relevant protected
term to eighteen years. So, in such a case, the first return would be a full five
years distant from the commencement of investment. This problem became
acute in the pharmaceutical industry after Congress required new drugs to be
effective as well as safe. 5 The new effectiveness requirement added to the delay
before manufacturers could market a patented drug, as more extensive testing was
required before the FDA could approve marketing the drug. Congress then
authorized extensions of the patent term to compensate for regulatory delay, but
the extensions do not fully compensate for those delays.76
Finally, it should be observed that potential customers may take time to
recognize the value of a new product and adjust their purchases accordingly.7 A
producer generally plans a promotional strategy with which to acquaint potential
" This discussion is premised upon a simple three stage model. The first stage is Merges' stage
of preliminary experimentation. See Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentabilit, supra note 8,
at 21. The second stage collapses much of Merges's more elaborate model into a stage in which
research is conducted directed to the generation of a patentable invention. In this second stage the
risks are whether the technology can be developed at all and whether a rival will do it first. See infra
notes 89, 92 and accompanying text. The third stage is the stage of commercial development,
discussed by Kitch, that occupies the initial years of the patent term. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 271.
Since the patentee receives no returns during the period of development, the period in which the
patentee is able to exercise its patent rights to generate a return on its investment is narrowed to the
patent period less the development period. If the development period were, say, five years, then only
fifteen years of the standard twenty-year patent term would generate a return on the patentee's
investment.
'5 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780
(1962) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
16 The Hatch-Waxman Act permits extensions of the patent term equal to the time in which the
patentee awaited final FDA approval plus one half of the post-patent-issuance time taken for
running clinical tests. Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. 5 156(c)(1), (2) (2002). The period calculated
in this matter, however, together with the remaining patent term cannot exceed fourteen years, 35
U.S.C. § 156(c)(3), nor can an extension exceed five years. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A). The extensions
provided in the Hatch-Waxman Act do not fully compensate for the delays in marketing a patented
pharmaceutical attributable to FDA regulation. See Daniel J. Gifford, Government Poliy Towards
Innovation in the United States, Canada, and the European Union as Manifested in Patent, Copyright and
Comapelition Laws, 57 SMU L. Riv. (forthcoming 2004).
" See, e..,Jayanta Bhattacharya & William B. Vogt,A Simple ModelofPhamiaceutialPrice Dynamics,
46 J.L. & ECON. 599 (2003) (observing that for this reason, producers of new pharmaceuticals tend
to sell at low prices during the early years of the patent term and to invest in advertising during that
period).
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purchasers to the characteristics of its new product."5 As a result, the sales
volume of a new product may increase over a period of years.7 9 Revenue,
accordingly, may be lower in the early years in which it is marketed than in later
ones.
2. The Inventor's Perspective Again. Implicit in the discussion above are the
economics underlying the decision of the inventor about whether to undertake
an investment in innovation. The basic economic questions are whether the value
of the patented invention is expected: (1) to exceed the cost of the investment,
and (2) to produce a return superior to alternative investments."° In making these
comparisons, the prospective investor necessarily compares the present cost (the
up-front investment) with future returns, which must be discounted both for their
uncertainty and their future dates."'
A stylized example will illustrate these matters. Suppose we estimate the
chances of successfully developing a new product (let's call it a widget) at 80 %.
Then we should discount our projected profits by 80%. Suppose further that we
know that three of our rivals are attempting to develop this product. The first to
succeed will receive a patent and block the others from the widget market. Since
we and our three rivals are starting out about the same time and with
approximately the same resources, our chances of developing the product first
would appear to be one in four, or 25%. Thus, on this assessment, we have a
2 5 % of 80% chance of success, or an overall probability of success of 20%. On
these probabilities, unless the expected return is extremely high and we are high-
risk takers, we should probably look for an alternative line of research and
development.
Let's add a new element. Our own prior research gives us an advantage
unknown to the others. As a result, we have concluded that we have a 90%
chance of developing the product first. Now our aggregate probability of success
is 90% of 80%, or 72%. The project, of course, is risky, but if the expected
returns are sufficiently high, then they can justify the risk. Those returns must be
discounted to 72% of their expected value in order to compare them with our
investment and alternative investments. Alternative investments, of course, also
have to be discounted for risk.
Let's make some additional simple assumptions for illustrative purposes. We
expect that our invention will generate revenues (in excess of production costs)
74 Id.
79 Id.
"' See P]NDYCK & RUBINFI.D, supra note 29, at 542 (considering a possible investment in the
light of alternative possible investments).
' See, e.g., David Tenenbaum, Valing Intellectual Property Assets, 19 No. 2 CoMItUIV.R &
INTFNI-A' LAW 1, 1, 4 (2002) (observing the need to returns discount for future date and risk).
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of $1,000,000 per year. Over a twenty-year patent term the total return would be
$20,000,000. The ex ante expected value of the patented invention, however, is
substantially less than $20,000,000. Ignoring for the moment the time required
for research and development, that $20,000,000 in future earnings must be
discounted to present value. Let's assume that we recognize earnings at the end
of each of the twenty years of the patent period. Then the $1,000,000 for the first
year is discounted by the interest rate: $1,000,000/(1 +r), where r is the rate of
interest. The $1,000,000 for the second year is discounted by the interest for
years one and two: $1,000,000/(1+r, and so on. The present value of the
$20,000,000 in future earnings thus is:8 2
20
$1,000,000/(1 +r)
i=1
At an interest rate of 5%, the $20,000,000 in future revenues would have a present
value of $13,850,320. So the present value of these revenues is only about 69%
of their nominal dollar amount. We also must discount the $13,850,320 for risk.
Recalling that we had an estimated 72% probability of succeeding in actually
acquiring the invention, the value of the expected invention is $9,972,230. That
is not quite 50% of the total expected future $20,000,000, expressed in nominal
dollars. If the investment required to develop the product is substantially less
than the $9,972,230, then it would provide a positive profit.
Suppose the required investment is $5,000,000. Then, on these figures, the
investment would generate a profit of $4,972,230 over a twenty-year period. The
attractiveness of that return depends upon its alternatives. Five million dollars
invested at 6% over a twenty-year period would produce $19,098,748, or a net
profit of $14,098,748 in nominal dollars or $5,054,202 in present value. Thus in
this case, the pursuit of the invention does not appear especially attractive as an
investment. An alternative disposition of the $5,000,000 at 1 % over the going
interest rate would be more profitable.
Thus, the incentive structure of the patent system requires assessment of the
expected return in the light of the investment necessary to generate that return. 3
To make that assessment, the inventor must discount future revenues to present
value and further discount for risk.' Such discounting is standard practice for
investors considering whether or not to undertake a particular investment or in
12 R.G.D. ALLEN, MIATHEMATICAt. ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMIsTs 232 (1938).
8" The processes of comparing expected return with investment is described, inter alia in
Christopher P. Bowers, Comment, Courts, Contracts, andtheAppropriate Discount Rate: A Quick Fixfor
theLegalLottegy, 63 U. CiAi. L. REV. 1099, 1123 (1996).
84 Id.
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selecting a particular investment from a range of alternatives. Yet the patent
system is dedicated to generating significant advances: No patent can be issued
unless the invention is nonobvious, a phrase meaning beyond the knowledge and
abilities of a competent professional in the field.85 The system itself thus courts
the risk that the purported inventor will not exceed the capabilities of his or her
peers. In the most successful inventions, the risk factor is reflected in the high
profits which those inventions command. 6 And the reliance of the patent system
upon incentives generated by the twenty-year period of exclusive rights also
exacerbates the difference between the return seen by observers (the dollar return
at the moment of the observation) and the incentive to the inventor (that return
discounted to its ex ante value).87 As shown below, these differences between the
expost and ex ante values are relevant in a variety of ways to the assessment of the
system's private and social costs and benefits.
IV. EXPLORING SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. THE ARROW ANALYSIS: DIFFERENT VALUES IN DIFFERENT MARKET
STRUCTURES
Arrow (who divided inventions into two categories) concluded that for
pioneer inventions, an innovator would set a royalty equal to a monopoly return."5
This would be true regardless of the industry market structure. 9 Despite the
monopoly return to the inventor, the public would incur an immediate benefit
because the large cost savings would press prices downward, below their level
prior to the invention.9 ° This benefit is easily seen in Figure 1 below. Let's
assume that the product was initially produced in a competitive market where the
cost and price are represented by the line PP and the output is XX. The
invention reduces costs to the level of c. Now the inventor licenses the invention
at a per unit royalty equal to the vertical distance between c and p. Consumer
15 The Patent Act requires that an invention pass the threshold of obviousness. That is, the
difference between the invention and the prior art must not be obvious to a person skilled in the art
pertaining to the subject matter of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
" See Bowers, supra note 83; see also David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, EconomicAspects of
Payent Card Systerns and Antitrust Poly Toward Joint Ventures, 63 ANTrlRUSi L.J. 861, 877 (1995)
(discussing the risk factor, investment in research, and returns viewed both expost and ex ante).
17 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 877.
"" Arrow refers to cases in which the cost reduction is sufficiently drastic that the optimum
monopoly price is less than the cost in the pre-invention period [p' < d. This Article refers to those
cases as involving pioneer inventions. See supra Part II.c.
89 Id.
' Thus, in Arrow's description of this situation the monopoly price is below the pre-invention
cost. Id.; see also supra note 88. A fortiori, the monopoly price would be below the preexisting price.
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surplus is the area under the demand curve down top, i.e., it is the area within the
triangle DAp, albeit the contribution to consumer surplus of the invention is not
the entire area of the triangle DAp but the lesser area of the trapezoid PP-Z-A-p.
Similarly, the social benefit produced by the invention is not the area of the
triangle D6cG, but the irregular five-sided figure PP-Z-A-B-c. The inefficiency
generated by the patent system is represented by the triangle AGB, representing
deadweight loss, i.e., the demands of those unsatisfied customers who value the
product more than its production cost (0c) but less than the patentee's price (0p).91
D
PPI
P E
CF
R
0 XX x
FIGURE 1
The second or "improvement" category requires some discussion. Arrow was
interested in how market structure affected the incentives to innovate. Although
his focus differs from that of the present Article, his analysis is useful for
exploring the economic effects of an invention of the improvement type. Arrow
observed that in the case of an improvement the inventor would set the royalty
in the full amount of the per-unit cost savings, thereby capturing the entire cost
savings for itself.9 2 But the revenues earned would differ depending upon the
market structure in which the invention was employed. In a competitive market,
the royalty would equal the unit cost savings multiplied by the industry output
immediately prior to the deployment of the invention.93 In a monopoly
91 See BORK, supra note 29; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, sypra note 29, at 292; Barnett, supra note
44, at 1269 (referring to deadweight loss as a significant social cost).
92 Arrow, supra note 4, at 620.
93 Id
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marketplace, the inventor's return would be less, because the value of the
invention would be limited to the unit cost savings multiplied by the smaller
monopoly output.94 The critical element in Arrow's analysis of improvement
patents is the constraint that the preexisting technology exerts upon the patentee's
pricing power.95 That constraint is examined below.
D
P M1
m2c 2 
\ 
,MR
cD 1
Xm I Xm 2  Xc I  XC2
FIGURE 2
Figure 2 depicts the Arrow hypothesis in diagrammatic form. In the diagram,
the monopolist's initial profit is represented by the rectangle formed by the
horizontal linep,,, on the top, the horizontal line c, on the bottom, the (vertical)
0 axis on the left side, and the vertical X,,, intersect on the right side (or X,(p,,, -
c,)). The monopolist's post-innovation profit is represented by the rectangle
formed by the horizontal linep,,2 on the top, the horizontal line c, on the bottom,
the (vertical) 0 axis on the left and the vertical X intersect on the right (or x, 2(p,,2
- c.). The increment to the monopolist's profits resulting from the innovation,
accordingly, is the difference between these two amounts. The difference in
monopoly profits is also shown in the area under the marginal-revenue curve
(MR). The pre-innovation profits are represented by the area under the MR curve
down to the initial cost curve c,. The post-innovation profits are represented by
the area under the MR curve down to the post-innovation cost curve c2. The
increment to the monopolist's profits from the innovation thus are represented
in the diagram by the area under the MR curve between the two cost curves c, and
94 Id
9' Id Since the preexisting technology is available, the patentee owning the new technology
cannot charge a royalty higher than he cost advantage that the new technology confers upon its
users.
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c,. This way of representing the increment to the monopolist's profits makes it
easy to show Arrow's point graphically. When the monopolist innovates, it can
capture additional profits represented by the area between c, and c, that lies under
the MR curve.96 But when a competitor firm innovates, it can capture additional
profits represented by the area between c, and c, all the way out to the pre-
innovation competitive output of X.,.
97
The preexisting technology, represented here by c,. constrains the royalty that
the patentee is able to charge. Improvements can range in significance all the way
from one that approaches (but does not reach) the cost-savings of a pioneer
invention, to the more common inventions that generate modest cost savings.98
In the context of linear demand and constant costs, all improvement inventions
generate a lower ratio of deadweight loss to profit (and to total surplus) than do
pioneer inventions. Restated, within the context of linear demand and constant
cost, this class of inventions appears, prima facie, to generate a higher ratio of
social benefit to social cost than does the class of pioneer inventions.
B. THE KAPLOW ANALYSIS
In a path-breaking analysis of the patent system and its connections to
antitrust law, Harvard Law Professor Louis Kaplow brought a new analytical
refinement to the evaluation of the patent system and its operation.99 Identifying
the social benefits of the patent system as the innovations that it engenders, and
the social costs of that system as the monopoly output restrictions which the
system provides as incentives for innovative activity, Kaplow directed his
attention to the system's marginal benefits and costs."°  As Kaplow rightly
indicated, a rational society would determine the level of innovation that it
" Figure 2, supra. The area under the marginal revenue curve (out to the point of output)
represents all of the monopolist's revenue. The area under its cost curve represents its costs. The
difference in those areas is its profits. When the monopolist reduced its cost from c, to co, it lowered
its costs and, because of those lower costs, increased its output. As a result, its profits increased.
The increase in profits is represented by the difference between the area under its marginal revenue
curve (out to the point of output) and the area under its new cost curve c. This profit increase is
represented by the area described in text.
"' When the competitor innovates, it charges licenses a royalty equal to the cost savings on the
pre-invention competitive-market output. This royalty base is larger than the base from which the
monopolist's calculates its savings from equivalent cost savings, because the monopolist has been
restricting output in order to charge monopoly prices from the beginning.
" Under this Article's adoption of Arrow's approach, inventions fall into two classes: pioneer
inventions or improvement inventions.
" Kaplow, supra note 7, at 1825-26.
Id. at 1823-25.
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desired, and would then generate that innovation at the least cost.' Ideally,
society should limit the patent term to the point when the marginal social costs
imposed by the patent system rise to the level of the marginal benefits that it
generates. 02
In analyzing the patent system's marginal social costs and benefits, Kaplow
hypothesized a one-year extension of the patent term."3 A one-year extension of
the patent term would increase the reward of the patent and thus would probably
generate more innovations." 4 The additional innovations generated by that one-
year extension would constitute the marginal benefit of such an extension.10 5 But
a one-year extension of the patent term would also impose additional social costs:
Allof the patent monopolies which were about to expire now would continue for
an additional year. The year extension would thus impose monopoly losses upon
society which would not occur in the absence of the extension. The monopoly
loss so imposed during the one-year extension would be the incremental, or
marginal, cost of that one-year extension. 6 Kaplow also worked backward to
compare the costs and benefits which would result from reducing the patent term:
What would be the social losses from the reduction in innovation which would
result from a one-year reduction of the patent term?' And what would be the
social benefits (in the elimination of monopoly restrictions) which would result
from such a one-year reduction of the patent term?'0 8
Kaplow forthrightly acknowledged that it is virtually impossible to determine
either the value of new innovation or the monopoly loss from a hypothetical
extension of the patent term.'09 He believed, however, that the analytical format
which he developed would be helpful in thinking about the issues. His marginal
analysis is a major contribution. Earlier writers had not focused their attention
on marginal costs and benefits. Kaplow's format, by considering marginal costs
and benefits, moves analysis and evaluation of the operation of the patent system
to a higher plane of conceptual clarity.
"l Id at 1822, 1834.
10 Id at 1825-27.
u,3 See also id at 1830, 1840.
'" Id at 1826.
"~Id
106 Id
"' Id at 1824.
'" Id at 1825.
'9 Id at 1833-34.
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C. A SIMPLE (AND LINEAR) MODEL
This Section will use this marginal analysis in assessing the operation of the
patent system. As Kaplow pointed out, protecting an inventor's work for more
years than necessary to stimulate his invention imposes a cost upon society in the
form of a restricted output." 0 Thus, some inventors would have produced their
inventions even without a stimulus from the patent system. For other inventions,
the costs of research and development, the risks of failure, and the risks of the
marketplace would deter the necessary innovative effort without the stimulus of
an exclusivity period provided by the patent system."' Yet for some inventions,
the necessary period of exclusivity might be very short. 12 The stimulus necessary
to generate other inventions might be longer, but still less than the actual patent
term. 1 3 For yet other inventions, exclusivity for the full patent term would be
necessary to provide an adequate stimulus." 4 Other potential inventions may well
go uninvented because even the twenty-year patent term is too short to provide
the requisite incentive."'
Let's begin our analysis by assuming that some inventions would be produced
without any period of exclusivity, some would be produced with a one-year
period, others with a two-year period, others with a three-year period, and so on.
Thus, we will assume that each year of the patent term produces an incremental
stimulus to generate more inventions. More precisely, we assume that invention
occurs in proportion to the investment in R&D. On these assumptions, more
investment in R&D generates increased invention and the increase in invention
is proportional to the increase in R&D investment. For purposes of the following
discussion, invention is measured in terms of a value derived from the market:
Inventions carry value determined by the demand for a patented invention, a
value derived from its attractiveness as a consumption good or from its ability to
produce new products or to lower production costs for preexisting products.
Let us assume that each year of the patent term provides the incremental
incentive necessary to generate new inventions over and above the inventions
generated by terms of lesser length. For purposes of exposition, we hypothesize
that each year of the patent term generates such additional inventions that (in an
unrestricted market) would generate an average of $1,000,000,000 per year over
"" Id. at 1825.
... In its decision whether to invest in research, a potential investor necessarily compares its
expected return with its projected costs and the risks inherent in the activity. Evans & Schmalensee,
supra note 86, at 877.
1t2 Kaplow, supra note 7, at 1826 n.29.
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their useful lives. Note, however, that because these inventions will be covered
byI patents, their output will be restricted during the patent term."6  For the
reasons set forth below, the annual social value represented by these inventions
during the patent term will be assumed to be 75% of the amount that it would be
in an unrestricted, competitive market. The monopoly restriction and
concomitant social loss imposed by the patentee is thus assumed to be equal to
25% of the social value in a competitive market. Social value is the combination
of producer and consumer surplus.
D
IR
CF 
D' 
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FIGURE 3
Figure 3 above represents the demand for a pioneer invention. The annual
value contributed by the production of the product in a competitive market is
symbolized by the area DFG. We assume that the product is patented, however,
so that the patentee restricts production to X, producing producer surplus
represented by the rectangle EABF, and a concomitant consumer surplus DAE.
The aggregate social value of the product is thus represented by the area DABF,
and the monopoly loss being the area AGB. Assuming a linear demand " ' for the
product and constant costs as in Figure 3, the monopoly loss is 25% of the total
1 " Patentees are assumed to exercise the exclusive rights that the patent law confers upon them.
Therefore, they will restrict output under their patented technology in order to maximize their
profits.
"7 This Article employs a linear model as an entry into its analysis of the patentee's situation.
The use of linear analyses is common in other critiques of the patent system. See, e.g., Abramowicz,
suqra note 27, at 162-68; Douglas Gary Lichtman, PridngProZac: Why the Governrnent Should SubsidiZe
the Purchase ofPatentedPharmaceuticals, 11 H,\i.J.L. & Ti-CH. 123,130 (1997). Later, this assumption
is dropped. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:75
2004] COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 101
area DFG: The triangle AGB is equal to the triangle DAE and is one half the area
of the rectangle EABF.
TABIE., 1: MiARGINAL SOCIAL BENEFI TS AND COSTS: NAVE V1RSION
[figures in millions of dollars]
Year PS CS+PS Monopoly Value of Marginal Marginal
(annual) (annual) Loss (annual) Invention Benefit Cost
1 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $250
2 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $500
3 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $750
4 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $1,000
5 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 S9,000 $1,250
6 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $1,500
7 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $1,750
8 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $2,000
9 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $2,250
10 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $2,500
11 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 S9,000 $2,750
12 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $3,000
13 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $3,250
14 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $3,500
15 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $3,750
16 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $4,000
17 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $4,250
18 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $4,500
19 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $4,750
20 $250 $750 $250 $9,000 $9,000 $5,000
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In Table 1l above, we consider marginal social costs and benefits using the
approach just outlined and add a number of additional assumptions. First, we
continue the assumption that each year of the patent term generates new
inventions whose production under competitive conditions would add
$1,000,000,000 of social value (i.e., producer surplus plus consumer surplus) to
the economy. And because these new inventions are patented, we continue to
assume that the patentees impose monopoly restrictions on production, thus
reducing the $1,000,000,000 of potential social benefit by 25% to $750,000,000.
Next, we determine how to capitalize the social value of inventions. Here we
make two observations. First, during the twenty-year patent term, the social value
is the discounted sum of the combination of producer and consumer surplus.
But the social value of the invention continues beyond the end of the patent term.
The social value of the patent term is the discounted sum of each year's consumer
surplus-that is now enlarged when the patent rights expire." 9 Together these
two sums equal the capitalized value of the consumer surplus unrestricted by the
exercise of patent rights. Using a 5% discount rate, the value of the inventions
generated by each year of patent protection would thus be twenty times the
earnings, or $20,000,000,000.
Alternatively, we could take a more conservative approach by drawing from
the practice of investors in the securities markets. Historically, a conservative
measure for the value of a stock was twelve times the annual per share earnings
of the company. 2 0 Following our conservative approach, we capitalize only the
N' PS is producer surplus or profit. CS is consumer surplus. This is the benefit that consumers
receive when they are able to purchase a product at a price below their reservation price. Their
reservation price is the highest price that they would be willing to pay for the product. Accordingly,
the difference between the demand curve (that symbolizes consumers' reservation prices and price)
is consumer surplus. The Monopoly Loss is the "deadweight loss" or the loss that society incurs as
a result of monopolist raising price to a supracompetitive level. At surpacompetitive levels, some
persons who would have been willing to purchase at prices equal to or higher than production cost
but less than the price set by the monopolist are not served. The failure to serve customers who are
wiling to pay the cost of producing the product is a misallocation of social resources and a loss to
society. The Marginal Benefit in the table describes the increment in value produced by the patent
system each year. The Marginal Cost describes the value that is not generated each year as a result
of that year's patent protection.
... Since the patentee can no longer restrict the use of the invention, there is no longer any
deadweight loss. What has been profit and deadweight loss during the patent period now becomes
consumer surplus.
", Over forty years ago, one author suggested that the previously widely-followed earnings
multiplier of ten for an industrial business was probably outdated, and that a ratio of fifteen or higher
might be more appropriate. See David R. Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the
Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HImV. L. Rl.V. 1098 (1962). Investors capitalize producer
surplus. Since we are concerned with social value, we capitalize the combination of producer and
consumer surplus but exclude the deadweight loss.
[Vol. 12:75
2004] COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 103
combination of producer and consumer surplus (omitting the deadweight loss).
Thus, we multiply the $750,000,000 (producer plus consumer surplus) by twelve
to arrive at a capitalized social benefit of $9,000,000,000. We use this figure for
social value in the analysis in Table 1 above.
On these assumptions, the patent restrictions applied to the inventions which
would have been produced in the absence of the patent system produce
unnecessary restrictions on those inventions for twenty years. For inventions
which would have been stimulated with only a one-year patent term, the actual
patent term produces unnecessary restrictions for nineteen years. For inventions
which would have been stimulated with only a two-year patent term, the actual
patent term produces unnecessary restrictions for eighteen years. Thus, each year
of the patent term adds restrictions on the output of a new class of inventions,
(i.e., those for whose generation a patent term ending a year earlier would have
been sufficient, to the restrictions imposed by earlier years). The marginal social
costs of patent restrictions thus rise with each year of the patent term.
We start with the most simple assumptions. Later, we will add some more
complexity. Table 1, supra, is based upon the assumption that each year of the
patent term generates inventions whose aggregate capitalized value is
$9,000,000,000. On that assumption, the marginal benefit from each year of the
patent term is a constant $9,000,000,000. The marginal costs of the patent
system, on these assumptions, gradually rise from $250,000,000 to $5,000,000,000.
On such assumptions, the patent term would have to be lengthened to thirty-six
years before its marginal cost would rise to the level of its marginal benefits. If
the patent system actually operates like the one hypothesized, there is little room
for concern that the patent term is unduly long.
I suspect that for a range each year of the patent term generates an increasing
marginal return.'12  If so, over that range marginal benefit would substantially
outpace marginal cost because new inventions would add their capitalized values
to the computation of the marginal benefit, substantially outpacing growth in the
aggregate monopoly restrictions. Ultimately, however, decreasing returns would
likely set in. 22 And, of course, a rapid shrinkage of marginal benefit after a rapid
rise would maximize the chances that marginal cost would then meet marginal
benefit.
"' Nordhaus appears to have assumed continually diminishing marginal returns to research
investment. See Nordhaus, supra note 5, at 23, 73-75. Professor F.M. Scherer, commenting on
Nordhaus, believes that it is more plausible to assume increasing returns to research, followed by
decreasing returns. F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optial Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretatio,
62 AM. ECON. Rr\v. 422 (1972).
12 Nordhaus, supra note 5, at 23, 73-75.
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D. EX POSTAND EXANTE VALUES
Note that the monopoly restriction impacts society now, at the time that the
output restriction occurs. The monopoly restriction is properly measured,
therefore, in the present at its full nominal dollar amount. 123 Yet that monopoly
restriction engenders an incentive to innovation only at its ex ante value. As the
patent term increases in length, the difference between the deadweight loss
(measured expos) and the incentive effect (measured ex ante) grows.
24
Thus, as observed in Part I, supra, the ex ante value to the patentee of each
additional year of the patent term declines over the life of the patent. This decline
is the necessary result of discounting future returns to their present values.
Because the ex ante value of the return generated by each year of the patent term
declines each year of that term, then on our assumption that all other factors
remain the same, the incentive effect of the patent term increases at a declining
rate over the patent term. Each year of patent protection generates a lesser
incentive to inventive activity than did the preceding year.
TABLE 2: MARGINAL SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS: DISCOUNTED VERSION
[figures in millions of dollars]
Year CS+PS Monopoly Value of Marginal Marginal Net Marginal
(Annual) Loss Invention Benefit Cost Benefit
1 $750
2 $714
3 $680
4 $648
5 $617
6 $588
7 $560
8 $533
9 $508
10 $483
$250
$238
$227
$216
$206
$196
$187
$178
$169
$161
$9,000 $9,000 $250
$8,571 $8,571 $488
$8,163 $8,163 $715
$7,775 $7,775 $931
$7,404 $7,404 $1,136
$7,052 $7,052 $1,332
$6,716 $6,716 $1,519
$6,396 $6,396 $1,697
$6,092 $6,092 $1,866
$5,801 $5,801 $2,027
123 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 877 and accompanying text.
124 Thus future earnings generate incentives to invest only in the amount of their present values.
$8,750
$8,083
$7,448
$6,844
$6,268
$5,719
$5,197
$4,700
$4,226
$3,775
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11 $460 $153 $5,525 $5,525 $2,180 $3,345
12 $439 $146 $5,262 $5,262 $2,327 $2,936
13 $418 $139 $5,012 $5,012 $2,466 $2,546
14 $398 $133 $4,773 $4,773 $2,598 $2,174
15 $379 $126 $4,546 $4,546 $2,725 $1,821
16 $361 $120 $4,329 $4,329 $2,845 $1,484
17 $344 $115 $4,123 $4,123 $2,959 $1,164
18 $327 $109 $3,927 $3,927 $3,069 $858
19 $312 $104 $3,740 $3,740 $3,172 $567
20 $297 $99 $3,562 $3,562 $3,271 $290
These considerations require modification of the analysis in Section c, supra.1
25
There it was assumed that each year of the patent term generates a constant
amount of innovation. We now modify that analysis by discounting future
returns to present values. This modification recognizes that throughout the
patent term, each year of patent protection generates a progressively smaller
increment to the incentive to inventive activity.
In order to discount future returns to present values, the selected discount rate
must be determined. In the following example, the discount rate is 5%. Consider
an invention that generates an income stream of $1.00 per year for the twenty-
year patent term. Discounted to present value at the 5% rate, the income for each
year falls from $1.00 in the first year to $.95 in the second year to $.91 for the
third year, and ultimately to $.40 for the twentieth year. Since a dollar of expected
revenue from each year of the patent term has a present value of less than the
present value of a dollar from the year preceding, we assume that the second year
of patent protection generates a lesser incentive to invest in research and
development than the first year. The third year generates a still lesser incentive,
and so on. On this reasoning, the second, third and subsequent years generate
incentives of 95%,91%, 86%, 82%, 78%, 75%, 71%, 68%, 64%, 61%, 58%, 56%,
53%, 51%, 48%, 46%, 44%, 42% and 40% of the incentive generated by the first
year revenues. Accordingly, in the following example, we assume that each of the
years of the patent term provokes investment that declines in these proportions.
The figures in the "value of Invention" column of Table 2 therefore are also
l21 See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
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adjusted downwards to reflect the lesser inventive activity. If the assumptions
underlying Table 2 accurately reflected reality, then the patent term would be
almost optimal. One additional year would bring the patent term to its optimal
length. Beyond that, additional years would produce negative net social values.
E. MAKING THE MODEL MORE COMPLEX
1. Modifiing the "Constant Cost"Assumption. Let's first consider dropping the
constant-cost assumption employed in the preceding analysis. When marginal
cost is rising, it intersects the demand curve more quickly than when marginal
cost is constant. 126 Thus, in cases involving pioneer inventions in which marginal
cost is rising, the deadweight loss will be less than the 25% of potential benefits
of the invention assumed above in Sections C and D of Part IV, supra. Of course,
a declining marginal cost curve produces the opposite effect. A monopoly
restriction in a situation of declining marginal cost produces a greater deadweight
loss than in the situation of constant marginal costs. 127 Yet economists commonly
assume that a firm's short-run marginal cost curve eventually rises, because in the
short-run the firm is unable to adjust the proportions at which it deploys capital
with labor. 28 As a result, its short-run marginal cost curve takes on a U-shape.
29
Moreover, a firm with a constantly declining marginal cost curve appears to be a
natural monopoly. 3 Since our focus is upon output restrictions generated by
patents (rather than other causes), natural monopolies fall outside the domain of
this Article. On the basis of these considerations, it seems appropriate now to let
marginal costs either rise or remain constant. For ease of statement let's assume
that the aggregate yearly output produced under pioneer patents is produced by
firms whose marginal cost curve is either flat or U-shaped.
If for each year most of the output value produced under pioneer patents is
produced by firms with flat or U-shaped marginal cost curves, then the analysis
presented in sections C and D above requires adjustment. While production
under conditions of flat (or constant) marginal cost and linear demand would
generate the results set forth above, production under U-shaped marginal cost
curves would generate less deadweight loss. Thus, allowing production under the
12, Because the demand curve declines to the right, it necessarily intersects sooner with a
marginal-cost curve that is rising to meet it.
12' A declining marginal cost curve intersecting at the same point with the marginal revenue curve
as a hypothetical constant marginal cost curve would add the area to the right of the intersection that
is between the marginal cost curves and under the demand curve to the deadweight loss that would
have been produced by the hypothetical constant marginal cost curve.
12' PINDYCK & RUBENFEID, stpra note 29, at 210.
' See, e.g., id at 224, 226.
3 Id at 350.
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latter conditions into the model would increase the ratio of social benefit to social
cost.,3
2. Including Improvement and Component Inventions. The ratio of social benefit to
deadweight loss is higher in improvement inventions than in pioneer
inventions.12 Indeed, the ratio appears to grow as the cost savings generated by
the invention falls. The highest ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss is
associated with modest cost improvements, and the lowest ratios are associated
with inventions that approach the cost saving magnitude of a pioneer invention. 133
Since the number of commercially valuable improvement inventions probably
exceeds the number of pioneer inventions by far, the linear model would be made
somewhat more realistic by adjusting it to include improvement and component
inventions.134 The result of this modification would necessarily increase the
overall ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss generated by the patent system.
It follows that under conditions of linear demand, the ratio between marginal
social benefit and marginal social cost appears to be greater than the three-to-one
ratio considered in Section D. The larger ratio is due both to the addition of
improvement patents to the universe of pioneer patents first considered, and to
the addition of production processes involving ultimately rising (or U-shaped)
marginal cost curves.
3. Dropping the Assumption of Linear Demand. We can now drop the assumption
that the demand curve is linear. Some of the current legal literature employs
linear assumptions, 3 ' but those assumptions oversimplify reality. Many actual
demand curves are probably convex to the origin.'36 This would likely be true
especially where the product in question appealed to a broad public and, as price
"3' If both a constant and risking marginal cost curve were to intersect with the marginal revenue
curve at the same point, the latter would produce a smaller deadweight loss but the same profit and
consumer surplus. Hence the ratio of social benefit to social cost would increase.
132 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
' See sapra note 98 and accompanying text.
14 See Maskus, supra note 42, at 478-79 ("In the vast majority of cases, invention involves minor
adaptations of existing technologies and products. The cumulative impacts of these small inventions
can be critical for growth in knowledge and productive activity.").
135 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 27, at 162-68 (criticizing Lichtman, supra note 117, at 130).
Lichtman, however, recognizes the critical role that his assumptions play in his analysis. Lichtman,
supra note 117, at 130.
"' This is likely to be true in the global market for pharmaceuticals where the marekt for many
products would expand enormously were prices lower. See, e.g., Theodore c. Bailey, Note, Innovation
andAccess: The Role of Compulsogy Licensing in the Development andDistribuion of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001
U. IIJ.J.L. TE:CH. & POj.'Y 193, 196 (2001) (stating that 90% of people with HIV/AIDS are located
in developing nations that cannot afford current prices; in such nations the demand curve should
be extremely elastic).
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dropped, became available to lower-income segments of the public. 37 Dropping
the preceding assumption of linearity, of course, substantially complicates the
evaluation of the patent system's social benefits and costs. Nonlinear curves
come in an endless variety of shapes and positions. In addition, there is no reason
to believe that all actual demand curves are continuous rather than kinked,
wrinkled, broken, or otherwise discontinuous. But bringing nonlinear demand
curves into the analysis is absolutely necessary because there is no reason to
believe that actual demand curves are linear. Moreover, broadening the model
may heighten appreciation of both social problems connected with the patent
system and their potential solutions. Let's take a few examples to see whether we
can learn anything from them.
Many simple convex demand curves are of the form of a constant over x
raised to a power. Curves of this form exhibit unitary elasticity throughout their
length where the exponent of x is one, inelasticity where the exponent is greater
than one, and elasticity where the exponent is less than one. Since monopolists
maximize their profits by pricing in the elastic portions of their demand curves,'38
demand curves of the form of k/x2 (or k/x 3, kIx', and so on) are not interesting
in a pure form, because they exhibit inelasticity throughout their length. If a
second constant is added, however, so that the curve is of the form k,/i 2 + k,
the curve becomes elastic at higher values of x and is asymptotic to k2. An
interesting aspect of this curve is that the associated marginal revenue curve rises
throughout. As a result, a constant marginal cost is initially higher than marginal
revenue. If it is higher than the asymptote, it will never intersect with the
marginal revenue curve, and marginal cost would exceed marginal revenue at
every level of output. As a result, there would be no output. But if a constant
marginal cost curve is lower than the asymptote, it will eventually intersect with
the rising marginal revenue curve.'39 Beyond that point, marginal revenue will
exceed marginal cost for all levels of output. In such a situation, there would be
no monopoly restriction on output; a monopolist in this situation would produce
to capacity. A curve of this type is illustrated in Figure 4 below.
"' If large numbers of lower-income people are unable to buy a product at its current price but
would buy it at lower prices, then at those lower prices the demand curve would show a curvature
to the right.
1 Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Eficienciesfrom the Consumer Viewpoint, 7 G1:o.
MASON L. REv. 707, 708 n.8 (1999).
13' A U-shaped marginal cost curve would, of course, also intersect with a rising marginal cost
curve.
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We now take a demand curve of the form of a constant over the square (or
other) root of x. In Figure 5 below, the demand curve is this form and the
exponent is one-half: The curve takes the form of a constant over the square root
ofx (k / or kx-). The marginal revenue curve corresponding to such a demand
curve takes the form of (12) (k/VT,) or ( )(kx'Y).
In the circumstances illustrated by Figure 5, below, a pioneer inventor would
favor a price-output policy determined by the intersection of its marginal cost
and marginal revenue curves at point E. It would produce X. units of output and
sell them at price P. It would earn a profit represented by the area P-MC-E-A,
and the resulting deadweight loss would be represented by the area under the
demand curve from A to B down to the marginal cost curve MC-E-B.
FIGURE 5
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In this circumstance (with a demand curve of the form kl/4-) the deadweight
loss is exactly equal to the seller's profits. The patent restriction thus appears
more significant than it did in the case where the demand curve took a linear
form. In the former case the deadweight loss was only one-half of the profits.
Here the deadweight loss is equal to the entire amount of the profits. Still, the
combination of profits and consumer surplus, generally know as total surplus,
exceeds the deadweight loss. Downward shifts in the cost curve would increase
total surplus, and because profit equals deadweight loss, would necessarily
increase the absolute amount by which total surplus exceeds deadweight loss.
The earlier projections of the balance between the social benefits and costs of
the patent system, made under assumptions of linear demand, do not fit these
demand curves which exhibit elasticity throughout. The demand curves in this
example (of the form of a constant over the square root of x) alter the ratio
between benefits and costs. Inventions for which the demand takes this form
would generate higher social costs than under the earlier analysis involving linear
demands. Moreover, other demand curves of the same form but involving
numerically higher denominators (such as the curve generated by a constant over
the square root of 2x or k / [2x ) produce an even higher ratio of deadweight loss
to profit. Indeed, the curve of the form k/42x follows the basic form of k/,7
but it is located further to the left, thereby further reducing profit in relation to
deadweight loss, so that the deadweight loss produced by monopoly pricing under
such a demand is actually larger than profit. Curves in the form of k / '1- or
(kxk), or variations on them or those involving smaller negative exponents,
would generate even higher ratios of deadweight loss to profit. In short, the
introduction of nonlinear demands shows that the potential deadweight loss
generated by the patent system could be very large indeed.
4. Recapitulation andAssessment. Examination of the social costs and benefits
of a patent system under the first set of highly simplified assumptions (all
patentees possessed monopoly power and all demands were linear) shows that
deadweight loss was limited to an amount equal to one-half of profit and one-
third of total surplus.14 ° When that model is broadened to include improvement
patents, the ratio of deadweight loss to social benefit is reduced.' Examination
of convex demands shows that demand curves of the form of kl/x + k2 would
not generate any deadweight loss at all: Either there would be no output (because
marginal cost exceeded marginal revenue at all possible levels of output), or there
would be output but no monopoly restriction (because marginal revenue would
eventually exceed marginal cost throughout the range of possible production).
'' See discussion of Figure 3, supra Part IV.c;.
141 Because the ratio of deadweight loss to social benefit in improvement patents is reduced, the
inclusion of improvement patents lowers the average ratio.
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Yet demand curves of different shapes produce an opposite result: Examination
of convex demand curves of the form of k/., shows that deadweight loss is
larger in relation to total surplus than under linear demands, and that under many
variations of the convex demand curve deadweight loss would actually exceed
profit.
This examination of the possible shapes of demand curves thus reveals several
matters. First, some types of demand curves (including both linear and some
nonlinear) generate high ratios of positive welfare effects to deadweight losses.
Second, some types of demand curves (k,/ix + k 2) are incompatible with
monopoly restrictions. Third, still other types of demand curves (k/I7) would
provide the context for a single-price monopolist to generate very large
deadweight losses. Fourth, improvement patents generate a lower ratio of
deadweight loss to profit under any type of demand curve. The ratio of
deadweight loss to profit and thus to aggregate welfare (i.e., total surplus)
generated by improvement patents decreases with the production volume that
preceded the introduction of the improvement.
These matters are significant for policymaking. In categories of patented
inventions producing high ratios of deadweight loss to welfare (i.e., total surplus),
marginal social cost meets marginal social benefit earlier than in those categories
where the opposite is the case. A policy prescription seems to follow: Provide
shorter patent terms for inventions with the highest ratios of deadweight loss and
longer terms for inventions with lower ratios of deadweight loss. One problem
such a prescription raises, however, is that while some judgments can be made
about how to set relative lengths of patent terms among classes of invention,
there is no baseline from which to set these relative terms. There is, moreover,
a second problem with such a policy prescription that is discussed below: What
do we know about the categories of invention that are likely to generate the
highest ratios of deadweight loss to welfare?
The category of invention that is likely to produce the highest ratio of
deadweight loss to welfare is a pioneer invention as we have defined it. 4 2 Thus,
the invention is a stand-alone product, rather than a component or improvement.
The invention is likely to be a product that is desired by many people, but that
many people are unable or unwilling to pay the monopoly price set by the
patentee.'43 In short, the demand for the product is a highly elastic one. The
142 See supra Part II.(:.
.4' Deadweight loss results, of course, from demand for the product at prices higher than the
marginal cost of producing it but less than the (super-competitive) price charged by the seller. As
demand increases, so to does the deadweight loss.
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demand curve may be kinked below the monopoly price where it becomes highly
elastic. Some pharmaceutical products are likely to meet this description.144
The preceding discussion of patentee pricing producing high ratios of
deadweight loss to welfare assumes that patentees set price at a single level for all
purchasers. Thus the analysis has been focused upon the deadweight loss
produced by a single-price monopolist. Yet it is in the circumstances giving rise
to high ratios of deadweight loss to welfare that a monopolist has the greatest
incentive to set a range of prices, with each price geared to a different market
segment. 145 Price discrimination by a patentee is discussed below. Here it is
relevant merely to point out that patentees able to price discriminate among
market segments may substantially reduce the deadweight losses that they would
otherwise generate. The argument referred to above for reducing the patent
terms of certain pioneer inventions, therefore, would not apply to these
price--discrim-nating patentees.
V. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND ITS BENEFITS
A. IN GENERAL
Deadweight loss falls as output increases beyond the single-price monopoly
output. Such increases in output can result from price discrimination.
Economists recognize that price discrimination carries the potential for increasing
output in monopoly markets.146 A monopolist that practices so-called first-degree
price discrimination (i.e., selling to each customer at the customer's reservation
price147) would expand output until all customers with reservation prices above
marginal cost were satisfied. 4 In such a situation, output would be at the
competitive level and there would be no deadweight loss.'49 In so-called third-
degree price discrimination, a monopolist sells the product at its most profitable
price to each of several segmented markets. The monopolist maximizes the
S44 ee supra text accompanying note 47.
14, See PINDYCK & RUIBINFJ ,D, stipra note 29, at 376-77 (explaining how price discrimination can
enable a seller to appropriate consumer surplus and deadweight loss); see alto Alden F. Abbott,
IntellectualPropet'y Licensing andAntitrustPoi: A Comparative Perspective, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'I. Bus.
801, 821 n.108 (2003) (observing that "[plrice discrimination may allow distributional inefficiency
(measured by deadweight loss) to be mininized by allowing the upstream firm to calibrate contract
terms to take into account differences among downstream actors in willingness to pay).
146 See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFF.Lr), supra note 29, at 372-74; F.M. SCHIFIER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL, STRUCIURE & MARKIT PI7RI)ORMANCI' 494-96 (3d ed. 1990).
1' A reservation price is the highest price that a customer would be willing to pay for the
product.
... PINDYCK & RUB1N1FJD, supra note 29, at 371.
' SCHEIRIFR & Ross, supra note 146, at 495.
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profits when its marginal revenues from each market are the same and are equal
to its marginal cost.' First-degree price discrimination always increases output.''
Third-degree price discrimination maximizes output when the demand curve in
the more elastic market exhibits a greater convexity than the demand curve in the
less elastic market.'
5 2
As observed above, a monopolist's incentive to price discriminate increases
as the deadweight loss from monopoly single-pricing increases. Since price
discrimination carries the potential for expanding output and reducing deadweight
loss when there are substantial differences in the elasticities among markets, a
patent policy that encouraged price discrimination in those circumstances would
possess considerable social merit. Because patent policy is probably too crude an
instrument to reflect differences in demand elasticity, a socially optimum patent
policy would just endorse all price discrimination by patentees.
B. DISCRIMINATION IN THE DOMESTIC MARKET
Despite its merits, the United States and other nations have not always looked
favorably upon price discrimination.' 5 3 In 1914, Congress directed section two
of the Clayton Act against large firms that used price discrimination to drive their
rivals from the market.5 4 Later, in 1936, Congress expanded section two in the
Robinson-Patman Act 5 5 in order to protect small retailers from aggressive price-
cutting by chain stores who were able to secure their supplies at discriminatorily-
favorable prices. In a series of legislative acts extending from 1916 to the present,
Congress has sought to prevent or constrain dumping, or price discrimination on
an international scale.'5 6 Yet price discrimination is a way not only for a seller
'5" PINDYCK & RuBIN171I.D, supra note 29, at 377.
151 Id
152 SCHIFI R & Ross, supra note 146, at 496.
Two provisions of European Union competition law are directed against price discrimination.
Article 85(I)(d) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community identifies
agreements that "apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage" as particularly suspect. Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85(1)(d), 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Similarly, Article
86(c) identifies the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions by a dominant firm
as behavior which constitutes an abuse of its position. Id art. 86(c).
15' Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 5 13 (2000)).
155 Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, §§ 1-4,49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a-13b,
21a (2000)).
156 See Antidumping Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 72 (2000)); Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (1921); Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,93 Stat.
144 (1979).
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possessing market power to increase its own profits, but also (under the
conditions identified above) to mute the anti-social effects of its power by
expanding its own output and concomitantly reducing deadweight loss. Price
discrimination is widely practiced in the United States in a variety of forms.
5 7
As pointed out above, the welfare loss from monopoly pricing is generally
highest when the monopolist sells to all customers at a single price."5 8 This
welfare loss is aggravated where the ratio between deadweight loss and profit is
high. Yet if the monopolist were able to sell to different segments of demand at
prices geared to those segments, that welfare loss might be significantly reduced.
This Article will now examine the pricing of pharmaceutical products.
To a significant degree, price discrimination appears to reduce deadweight loss
in pharmaceuticals within the United States domestic market. Indeed, even at a
time when price discrimination was most disfavored, Congress recognized its
potential good. Within two years after it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to
protect small businesses from large chain-store competition, Congress enacted the
Nonprofit Institutions Act in order to ensure the legality of price discrimination
in favor of nonprofit institutions."5 9 A major channel of distribution of
pharmaceutical products involves so-called closed door sales to hospitals and
other health care institutions for the use of their patients."60 In addition,
pharmaceuticals are sold for a variety of prices to, or under arrangements with,
wholesale drug chains, health maintenance organizations, and insurance
companies.16 A wide variety of theorists view bargaining by these and similar
organizations as a route for driving down pharmaceutical prices.
16 2
157 PINDYCK & RUBINFPID, supra note 29, at 376.
",8 The monopolist can reduce the welfare loss when the monopolist replicates (as far as it is able)
first-degree price discrimination and (when market segments exhibit significantly different elasticities)
third-degree price discrimination. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying test.
159 Nonprofit Instructions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c (2000). The Supreme Court has nonetheless held
the Robinson-Patman Act applicable to purchases by state agencies for resale in competition with
retail pharmacists. Jefferson County Pharmal. Ass'n v. Abbot Labs., 460 U.S. 150, 171 (1983).
1 , Dennis S. Corgill, Distributing Products Under the Nonprofit Institutions Act: Price Discrimination,
Arbitrage, andFraudin the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 2001 BYU L. RWIV. 1383,1394-95 (2001); Arti K. Rais,
The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: BalancingInnovation Incentives, Cost, andAccess in the Post-
Genomics Era, 2001 U. Iu.. L. Ri.V. 173, 187-88 (2001).
1" See, e.g., United States v. Ferro, 252 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1999).
162 See, e.g., Sara Fisher Ellison & Wallace P. Mullin, Gradual Incorporation of Information:
Pharmaceutical Stocks and the Evolution of President Cnton's Health Care Reform, 44 J.L. & ECON. 89, 124
(2001) (reporting that the "stock market judged that the bargaining between cost-conscious health
insurance purchasing cooperatives and health care providers would result in much lower prices for
pharmaceutical companies than those prevailing previously"); Stephen R. Latham, Pharmaceutical
Costs: An Overview andAnaysis of Legal and Poligy Responses by the States, 24 J. Lix A .MED. 141, 148-49
(2003) (discussing the use of formularies by institutional purchasers and the impact of those
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C. DISCRIMINATION IN THE GLOBAL MARKETS
On the international marketplace, prices often vary substantially from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and this price variation (or discrimination) may reduce
global deadweight loss. 63 Indeed, prices of pharmaceutical products vary widely,
for example, among the nations in North America and among the nations in
Europe. Recent proposals to alleviate perceived high pharmaceutical prices in the
United States by allowing purchases of pharmaceuticals in Canada for use within
the United States have drawn attention to different pricing in different national
markets.'64 Pharmaceutical prices are lower in Canada than in the United States
because Canada exerts control over pricing through its Patented Medicine Prices
Review Board. 6 ' Pharmaceutical prices in the United Kingdom are generally
lower than in Germany and the Netherlands because the U.K. government
maintains an effective ceiling on their prices.'66 Indeed, government policies on
controlling pharmaceutical prices have varied substantially over the years within
the European Union, giving rise to widespread arbitrage. 6 '
Keying prices of pharmaceuticals to market demand in different national
marketplaces would appear to be a means of both increasing the availability of
these products to people that need them and to increase the profits of the
pharmaceutical companies. The most obvious impediments to this approach are:
purchasers' ability to redirect their trade); Michele L. Creech, Comment, Make a Run for the Border
Why the United States Government is Looking to the International Marketfor Affordabk Prescription D rugs, 15
EMORY INT'I. L. REv. 593, 611 (2001) (identifying the source of the problem of high pharmaceutical
prices as a lack of bargaining power by American consumers or their surrogates).
163 Prices vary among the various nations in the West, which produces disputes resulting from
the activities of arbitrageurs. U.S. companies frequently discount pharmaceutical prices in third wold
locations in order to compete with locally produced generics. See Donald E. deKieffer, The Mexican
Drug Connection: How Trade in Pharmaceuticals has Wrecked the FDA, 9 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 321,326
(2002-03); PeterJ. Hammer, DifferentialPritdngofEssentialAids Drugs: Markets, Politics and PublicHealth,
5J. INT'L. ECON. L. 883, 889 (2002) (concerning the desirability of price discrimination throughout
the world, especially in poor nations).
164 See, e.g., A. Bryan Baer, Price Controls Through the Back Door The Parallel Importation of
Pharmaceuticals, 9J. INTEI.i.. PROP. L. 109, 109-10 (2001).
16 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. P-4, S. 91 (1985) (Can.); see, e.g., Creech, supra note 162, at 615
(discussing the Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board); Patricia I. Carter, FederalRegulation
of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 215, 245-49
(1999).
166 Thomas Hays, Paranova v. Merck and Co-Branding of Pharmaceuticals in the European Economic
Area, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 821, 823 (2004) ("Mhe buying power of the National Health Service
trusts in the United Kingdom tends to drive down the price of pharmaceuticals there ... ").
167 Case 267/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285; Case 187/80, Merck &
Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063; Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974
E.C.R. 1147.
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(1) the possibility of arbitrage diverting discounted products back to Western
markets and undercutting Western prices, and (2) engendering resistance to
Western pharmaceutical prices as knowledge of the discount prices provided to
third world countries spreads in the West.'68
D. ENCOURAGING PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN GLOBAL MARKETS
The economic interest ofpharmaceutical manufacturers motivates them to sell
their products in ways that maximize profits, and price discrimination may further
that goal. As observed above, as the deadweight loss increases relative to the
single monopoly price, price discrimination becomes ever more attractive to the
seller and is likely to significantly reduce the social loss that results from a
monopolistically set single price.
Similar issues are present on the international marketplace. Large variations
in wealth between the developed, developing and underdeveloped nations means
that there are vast disparities in the purchasing powers of their publics.
Pharmaceutical companies could benefit if they were capable of selling at a range
of prices keyed to each sector of demand.'69 A major impediment to the
implementation of such a program, however, is the potential for arbitrage.' In
Europe, where governmental interventions in markets have forced prices to
comparatively low levels in certain national markets, arbitrageurs have seized the
opportunities of purchasing in the low priced markets and exporting into high
priced markets. 7' Probably a major impediment to pharmaceutical companies
selling at low prices in the underdeveloped or developing world is the potential
for arbitrage that such sales would engender. Arbitrageurs would be likely to
purchase at third world prices for re-export to the West for sale at North
American or European prices.
Many commentators interested in increasing the availability ofpharmaceuticals
to third world nations have directed their attention to the problem of potential
arbitrage, and to the potential for arbitrage to discourage low-price sales in third
"' Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining GlobalAccess to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of
Patent Protection Rights: The South Afican Exampk, 7 Bui.i. HUM. RTs. L. RiV. 137, 155 (2001)
(comparing the Italian price of Fluconazole of $23.50 with the Indian price of $.95).
'i" Doctors Without Borders reports on its web site that it has persuaded many pharmaceutical
companies to sell at discount prices in third world markets. See general# MFI.)I.(NS SANS
FRANIFtAIS & "HF, DRUGS M(R NI"w,iC'TI-m DISF.ASI's WORKING GItoui, FiAl. IMBAI\Ncr:
THF. CRISIS IN R.ISIAR('H AN) Di.IO1MI.NlNTFOR DRUGS FOR Npi .I,1 DISFASFS (1999),
availabk at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pubcations/reports/2001/ fataLimbalance-
short.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
t, See, e.g., Hammer, supra note 163, at 888-92.
171 See cases cited supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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world nations. 72 Most of these commentators have focused their attention on
the impact of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine and on how a doctrine of
international exhaustion would facilitate arbitrage. ' 73 They have also directed their
attention to provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement that
prevent (or appear to prevent) governments from interfering with arbitrage
operations.' 4 They have argued that that in order to effectively prevent arbitrage
in such situations, governments must be enlisted in the task. 171 Purely contractual
restrictions between the exporting pharmaceutical company and its third world
customer may be inadequate, these critics have contended, to provide the needed
protection. 7 ' Even the customs service or health ministries of third world
nations may not be up to the task.'7 7 Rather, according to these commentators,
what is needed is multi-governmental cooperation that involves the governments
of the exporting nation, the importing nation, and the governments of all the
nations that are potential recipients of re-exports.1
7
To what extent does the WTO regime impede arrangements that might
otherwise facilitate the delivery of patented pharmaceuticals to third world
nations? This question cannot be answered without considering both the text of
the Treaty, the Doha Declaration, and related developments. Considered by itself,
the WTO does appear to bar the cooperation among nations that could effectively
prohibit arbitraging of pharmaceutical products, as the critics have contended.
7 9
Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), incorporated
into the WTO Agreement, prohibits any party to the Agreement from imposing
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports. 8 Accordingly, a simple reading
17' See, e.g., Amir Attaran, The DOI-HA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Access
to Pharmaceuticals, and Options under IPTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTEIJL PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859,
879-80 (2002).
173 See Hammer, supra note 163, at 888-92; Attaran, supra note 172, at 872; see also Darren E.
Donnelly, Comment, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the Exhaustion of Rsghts Doctrine,
13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445,453 n.40, 511-12 (1997) (concerning the first-
sale or exhaustion doctrine).
174 See Attaran, supra note 172, at 880-83; M. Gregg Bloche, IFTO Deference to NationalHealth
Poligy: Toward an Interpretative Principle, 4J. INT'L ECON. L. 825 (2002) (referring to General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1995, art. XI, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 17, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATI]); Hammer, supra note 163, at 898-903.
175 Attaran, supra note 172, at 880.
176 Id
177 Id
179 Id
179 See id at 880-81.
18 GATT, spra note 174:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
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of the literal language of Article XI would, as those commentators have suggested,
appear to prohibit inter-governmental cooperation designed to prohibit exporting
pharmaceuticals from poor nations or to bar importation into wealthier ones.'81
Yet, there is much more to be said.
First, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits governments to impose
compulsory licenses on patent holders in the case of a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency.'8 2 At the time of the anthrax scare in the
United States, the U.S. government considered using this power to compel
licenses on Cipro, a patented antidote to anthrax, from Bayer, the German
patentee. 8 3 So did Canada."8 The HIV/AIDS epidemic, and other epidemics in
third world nations would appear to allow countries to use this Article 31
authority to impose compulsory licenses upon patented pharmaceuticals that
provided needed treatments.
Article 31, however, was drafted without consideration of the fact that many
poor nations lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Compulsory licensing
does not help when there are no potential domestic manufacturing licensees.
Accordingly, in November 2001, the ministers of the WTO member states,
meeting at Doha, issued the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (Doha Declaration).' 85 This Declaration stated that the TRIPS Agreement
"should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all."' 86 The ministers also recognized that WTO member nations
lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities might experience difficulties in
attempting to use the compulsory licensing provisions of Article 31.8 In so
doing, they implicitly recognized that Article 31 had been drafted without taking
into account that some nations lacked the productive resources to take advantage
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party.
I At least one commentator has also argued that discount sales to third world markets would
be vulnerable to attack as dumping. See Attaran, supra note 172, at 882. Attaran admits, however,
the government of the recipient nation would be unlikely to challenge low-priced sales that benefited
its own citizens, at least when there was no domestic pharmaceutical industry able to supply the
domestic market and when other equally low-priced sources of the product were unavailable. Id
812 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31.
's' David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Pub/ic Health, and InternationalLaw, 3 CHI.J. INT'i.L. 7,21 (2002).
' Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIs. INT'I. L.J. 481, 515 (2002).
7 WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://docsonlne.wto.org/gen-home.asp.
186 Id 4.
187 Id 6.
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of its provisions. Accordingly, the ministers instructed the council for TRIPS to
recommend a solution to the General Council of the WTO. 89 On August 31,
2003, the General Council issued its decision.'89 The General Council decision
effectively allows nations to import patented pharmaceuticals from abroad to deal
with national health emergencies, even though those pharmaceuticals had not
been produced with the permission of the patentee. In other words, compulsory
licensing would effectively extend to suppliers from abroad when the nation
experiencing the health emergency lacked its own manufacturing capability. Since
many of the nations experiencing HIV/AIDS health emergencies lack their own
pharmaceutical manufacturing capability, the Doha Declaration and its
implementation under the General Council decision have significantly corrected
the unintended rigidity of the TRIPS language. But the Doha Declaration and the
General Council decision also shed light on the arbitraging issues discussed in this
Article.
In approving the use of compulsory licenses for foreign suppliers, the General
Council took steps to ensure that the entire production of the product produced
under those licenses would be applied to the national health emergency and that
none would be diverted to other markets. The Council mandated that "only the
amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s) may be
manufactured under the license and the entirety of this production shall be
exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs to the Council for
TRIPS."' 90 The General Council decision also required the exporting member to
inform the TRIPS Council about the identity of the licensee, "the product(s) for
which the license has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted,
the country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration
of the license."''
And, "in order to ensure that the products imported... are used for the
public health purposes underlying their importation," the decision requires eligible
importing members to "take reasonable measures . . . to prevent re-
exportation."' 192 The decision also requires all members "to ensure the availability
of effective legal means to prevent the importation into, and sale in, their
territories of products ... diverted to their markets inconsistently with" these
provisions.
9 3
SId.
s WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2,2003), available athttp://docsonine.wto.org/gen-
home.asp.
Id. 2(b).
'9' Id 4.
192 Id.
1" Id. 5.
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Second, it is unclear why contractual and licensing restrictions would not
afford a degree of protection against arbitrage. The exporting pharmaceutical
company could require, as a term of the sales agreement, that the purchasing
firms or other organizations receiving the pharmaceuticals in the importing nation
agree not to re-export and to take reasonable steps to ensure that its distributees
avoid re-export.'94 It is also possible that patents underlying these products could
be employed as a base for licensing restrictions that effectively barred re-export.
Third, patent law may, in some circumstances, provide assistance in curbing
or impeding arbitrage. Its usefulness depends in part upon the patent exhaustion
or first sale doctrine, and how that doctrine is implemented in the nations
involved, or potentially involved, in arbitrage. As that doctrine is reflected in U.S.
law, a patentee exhausts its rights over a particular unit of a patented product after
it has sold that unit.'9 5 Thereafter the purchaser is generally free to resell that unit,
as the purchaser pleases. This doctrine is reflected in the patent law of most other
nations, producing similar results.' 96 But nations differ on how they treat sales
abroad. Some nations follow a doctrine of international exhaustion, under which
a sale anywhere in the world exhausts the rights of the patent holder over the
units sold.'97 The purchaser is then free to resell the product anywhere, including
resales within the domestic market of the patentee. Other nations limit their use
of exhaustion to their domestic markets. 9 8 In these nations, a domestic sale
would exhaust the patent holder's rights over units sold in the domestic market,
but a sale abroad would not give the purchaser a right to resell in the domestic
market. In the past, U.S. courts tended to apply exhaustion to unrestricted sales
abroad by a U.S. patentee or a party in privity with a U.S. patentee. 9' Recently,
however, the Federal Circuit has ruled that for exhaustion to apply, "the
authorized first sale must have occurred under the United States patent," a view
that appears to embrace a domestic, rather than international, view of
194 The Patent Act grants the authority to assign rights to limited geographical parts of the United
States. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2002). Territorially limited patent licenses abroad are also generally upheld.
See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1981). On the
extent to which license restrictions can constrain the actions of purchasers from those licensees, see
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 357 (1938).
' United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404, 408 (1942)
('[[he authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a
relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.").
196 See Case 267/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, 133.
117 See Ronald L. Yin, Hardware and Software Licensing Issues for the 1990s, 19 HASTINGS INT'l &
COMP. L. REV. 691, 697-99 (1996) (discussing international exhaustion).
' See Case 267/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, 133.
199 See, e.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453,456 (1873); Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp.
v. United Aircraft En'g. Corp., 266 F. 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1920).
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exhaustion. 200 Even under the traditional approach, international exhaustion was
of limited scope: When foreign sales of a patented product are conditioned upon
their exclusion from the United States, courts have barred their importation.20
In addition, the cases have generally refused to apply international exhaustion to
the detriment of a rights holder under a U.S. patent where the foreign sales were
made without the latter's consent.0 2 The European Union follows a policy under
which sales within any member state of the Union exhaust a patent holder's
rights.2 3 After such a sale, the units sold may be resold anywhere within the
Union. A sale outside of the Union, however, does not confer on the purchaser
a right to resell within the Union.20 4 Differentially priced sales within different
member states of the Union are vulnerable to arbitrage but it is not clear whether
low priced sales of patented products outside the European Union create a
potential for export back into the Union. To the extent that arbitrageurs sought
to re-export pharmaceuticals to nations that followed a doctrine of international
exhaustion, patent law would not provide a means for making such re-export
unlawful. Although commentators focus considerable attention on the first sale
doctrine and issues of international exhaustion, these legal issues are not
necessarily the key to preventing arbitrage.
Fourth, the patent law itself contemplates the imposition of territorial
limitations. While the law speaks to territorially limited assignments of rights
within the United States, 25 it is also clear that a patentee may grant territorially
limited licenses.20 6 Of course, once a licensee makes a lawful and unconditional
sale to a third party, the third party can deal freely with the unit that it has
purchased. If the sale takes place abroad, then the ability of the third party to
export to the United States raises issues of exhaustion. But if the patentee
conditions the right of the licensee to sell for use solely within the jurisdiction in
2111 Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907,
1914 (Fed. Cit. 2001).
"' See Dickerson v. Tinlng, 84 F. 192, 194-95 (8th Cit. 1897); Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 524,
527 (2d Cir 1893).
2' See Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697,703 (1890); Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453
F. Supp. 1283, 1285, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428,430 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
-3 Case 267/95 Merck & Co. v. Prirnecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285.
2S4 See Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329 (concerning
copyright infringement, and suggesting how EU authorities would treat international exhaustion
issue involving patent).
21 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (providing procedural assignments of patents in foreign countries).
2"', See Prima Tek II LLC v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742, 1745
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Section 261 recognizes, and courts have long held, that an exclusive, territorial
license is equivalent to an assignment.").
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which the licensee is located, then a sale by the licensee so conditioned does not
convey unrestricted title to the purchaser. °7
In a case in which a United States patentee delivers goods to a distributor
located in a particular third world nation for distribution to users within that
nation, the legal analysis would be similar. The goods would be delivered to the
distributor conditioned on its selling only to local users.2 °8 Sales beyond the
mandate of the license would be unlawful, and would not confer first-sale rights
on the purchaser, at least not to those aware of the license limitations.2 °9
Finally, a rather obvious means for a pharmaceutical company to sell its
products at low prices in a poor nation while impeding potential arbitrage would
be to limit the volume of sales to estimates of local demand. 21° The principal
problem would lie in obtaining accurate estimates. But the companies' own
marketing experiences both in the target market and in other similar markets may
prove helpful. In addition, governments in the target markets would probably be
willing to assist in the estimates of local demand. In cases where the importer was
a government or government-controlled distributor, advance estimates of demand
might be unnecessary. In these cases, the governmental interest would lie in
ensuring that manufacturers routed the purchased drugs to the patients who
needed them, and, in order to ensure the delivery of drugs in the future, to take
steps to discourage arbitrage. Patent law would support this scenario indirectly,
since by ensuring that the patentee is the only source of the product, it ensures
the effectiveness of the patentee's limitation on export volumes.
VI. CORRECTING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The most apparent weakness of the patent system in performing its function
of fostering invention lies in the deadweight losses that this system generates.
Generally, these deadweight losses are a modest price for encouraging invention.
Indeed, since there is no deadweight loss at all without the development of both:
(1) a new product, and (2) one for which there is a demand, these losses are a
measure of technology growth. To the extent that the exclusivity conferred on
a patentee is necessary to generate an invention, the resulting deadweight loss is
not a social loss at all. Yet as discussed above, to the extent that exclusivity is
" Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. at 187.
208 Id
~'Id
,20 See, e.g., Case C-2/01, Bayer AG v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys. (Jan. 6, 2004) (stating
that a pharmaceutical company lawfully limited its sales to estimates of local demand in order to
forestall arbitrage).
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unnecessary (as, for example, by extending longer than necessary), it can become
a social cost.
The pharmaceutical industry provides an example of where deadweight losses
may be large when measured on a global scale. Thus the pharmaceutical industry
may be more of a candidate for revealing the weaknesses of the patent system
than other industries. It is possible that the usefulness of the market for
supplying information about needs to prospective inventors is at its lowest in the
sector of the pharmaceutical industry that is concerned with the development of
remedies for widespread life-threatening disease. It is a matter of common
knowledge that cures are needed for diseases afflicting large populations. Thus,
the close interaction between the patent system and the market pharmaceutical
industry may be less socially advantageous in this sector of the pharmaceutical
industry than in other industries: Here, market-based information is less needed,
and the patent system's market-based incentives carry a potential for generating
unduly high deadweight losses.21
These considerations raise the question of whether another form of financing
for developing of lifesaving pharmaceutical products would be desirable. Public
funding of such development, if successful, would generate the larger aggregate
welfare since there would be no patents and hence no deadweight losses. But, to
raise the question of public funding is also to raise the question of who would
ultimately pay for that public funding. That question, in turn, leaves unanswered
the question of who pays for the development of pharmaceutical products today.
The answer to the latter question is that although pharmaceuticals are paid for by
the publics of Western nations, the bulk of the financial contribution comes from
211 The pharmaceutical industry also reveals other dysfunctions connected with the patent system.
As observed in Part I of this Article, prices of patented pharmaceuticals reflect the exclusive rights
that the patent system confers upon their patentees. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Consumers complain that these prices are unduly high, but exclusive patent rights are designed to
produce such prices. If those prices are high, that is the result that the patent system contemplates.
High prices generate the incentives necessary to stimulate inventive activity. Yet when the
government responds to consumer dissatisfaction by subsidizing purchases of patented
pharmaceuticals, the prices of these products will tend to rise. Government subsidization of
consumers increases demand and thus price. This subsidy to consumers ultimately results in a
subsidy to the pharmaceutical producers.
If, as is likely, the amended Medicare Act generates higher pharmaceutical prices in the United
States, the international problem is likely to be exacerbated unless the patentees sell at discounted
prices in poor countries. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). Purchasers in poor countries now complain that
they are priced out of the market. When U.S. prices rise further, the gap between U.S. prices and
affordable third world prices will increase. As argued above, however, the gap between U.S. and
third world prices need not deprive third world publics of patented pharmaceuticals, so long as the
patentees are willing to set prices in third world markets targeted to the demand within each market.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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the American public.21 2 Prices are higher in the United States than elsewhere.
Moreover, although the U.S. government does not pay list prices for
pharmaceutical products, it nonetheless subsidizes them in its Medicaid program
and, under recently enacted legislation, will now subsidize them in its Medicare
program.2 13 In short, the U.S. public, through purchase prices, insurance
premiums, and taxes, pays a disproportionate part of the research and
development cost for new pharmaceutical products. 214
To raise the possibility of public funding for lifesaving pharmaceutical
products also raises the question of whether that public funding should be shared
by all or most of the world's nations. The entire world benefits, or potentially
benefits, from pharmaceutical research. Some formula, perhaps keyed to each
nation's gross domestic product or to its per capita income might produce both
a more equitably shared source of financing and a major advance in global
welfare. The result, of course, would be that Western nations would make the
largest contributions. This result mimics the present system in which U.S.
consumers pay the highest prices, Canadian and European consumers pay lower
prices, and the lowest prizes are paid by consumers in those poor countries where
the pharmaceutical companies sell at discount prices. This financing arrangement,
however, would have the advantage of transparency, open bargaining, and an
agreed-upon distribution of the burden. The extent to which other Western
nations free ride upon U.S. consumers' support of research and development
would probably fall. The public funding of research would dispense with patent
rights and the deadweight losses that accompany their exercise. Global welfare
would advance substantially. Discontent in the third world over patent policies
that prevented or impeded their publics from treatments available elsewhere
would be reduced. And a by-product of this reduced discontent would be the
strengthening of TRIPS.
212 See 2001 STATISTICAl ABSTRA(71', supra note 26.
2' Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066) (2003).
214 Although U.S. consumers and taxpayers bear the burden of supporting pharmaceutical
research, existing U.S. policy may confer certain advantages on American producers. See The Trouble
with Cheap Drugf, EcONOMST, Jan. 31, 2004, at 59-60.
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